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An Outline of Takings
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
This issue of the University ofMiami Law Review is devoted prin-
cipally to the proceedings of a Conference, which Professor Larry
Alexander organized on my book, Takings: Private Property and the
Power of Eminent Domain. I The Conference was held in late January
1986 at the University of San Diego Law School. The arguments that
surged to and fro in those sessions were among academics who had a
close familiarity with the book, the structure of its argument, and the
direction of its conclusions. In order to make that discussion more
intelligible to the reader not familiar with Takings itself, the editors of
the University of Miami Law Review have asked me to provide a brief
introduction to the major themes of the book. The purpose of this
introduction is to set the framework for the debate and discussion that
follows. I shall save my own response to my critics until the end of
this issue.
At the outset it is useful to note that Takings proceeds at two
levels. On the first, it is a textual analysis of one provision of the
Constitution, the eminent domain clause, which provides "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
At a second level, the book is an effort to justify that principle of
social organization by showing how the systematic application of the
clause has very powerful functional roots: while conceptions of social
utility are hard to state and to identify, the society which adheres to
the demands of the eminent domain clause will find itself better able
to obtain prosperity for all of its members than one which deviates
from this principle. The book therefore contains both traditional tex-
tual arguments and social justifications designed to show why the emi-
nent domain clause, as interpreted, makes sense. Such seems
unavoidable for any book which wants to serve a dual function, espe-
cially because it turns out that the connection between constitutional
language and social function is more intimate than one might expect
at first blush.
In order to make the main lines of the argument clear, I first
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want to address some of the basic assumptions of my approach. The
first section thus discusses in connection with the image of "two pies,"
the basic questions of political organization that any society must
answer. Thereafter I shall turn to matters more closely related to the
eminent domain clause itself, and to the four specific textual issues
that the eminent domain clause raises, and how I propose to resolve
them.
II. Two PIES
Throughout the book I rely upon what is called in the Introduc-
tion the Tale of Two Pies (ch. 1).2 Stated briefly, the inner pie repre-
sents the distribution of holdings under a system of private property.
The outer ring indicates the gains which can be achieved by a reas-
signment of property rights undertaken through collective action
where voluntary transactions themselves cannot be undertaken. In
principle, one can conceive of a set of arrangements of private prop-
erty-the inner pie-which allocates all things of value to various per-
sons. Those persons will attach subjective value to what they own,
and will in general be prepared to part with it (when allowed to do so)
only if they receive something in exchange which they value more
highly. Nonetheless, there are many situations in which the voluntary
transactions are precluded because the total transaction costs exceed
the total gains from the exchange. This result is apt to happen under
circumstances where there are a large number of individuals who find
it difficult to bargain with each other-indeed everyone else-simulta-
neously. If there were some way in which exchanges between these
parties could be coerced, then these bargaining problems could be
overcome, and the gains thereby generated, at least in theory, could
be distributed amongst the individuals who have been forced to par-
ticipate in these transactions-the outer pie. This problem can arise
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before there is any well formed government: Hobbes's war of all
against all is easily understood as a bargaining breakdown that ren-
ders the holdings of the inner pie unstable and prevents the creation of
any social surplus through collective action. Takings rests on the
view that the power of the state is needed to insure that violence and
disorder are controlled-a function accepted by limited and extended
governance theorists alike. Political organization is thus best under-
stood as arising out of a network of forced exchanges in which indi-
viduals are taxed by the state and receive in exchange the protection
of the remainder of their holdings not taken by taxation.3
These problems with collective action do not, however, end with"
the formation of the state, but continue to manifest themselves in
many ways after it is formed. The eminent domain clause allows the
state to take for public use, but only upon the payment of just com-
pensation. It is accordingly well designed to overcome holdout, coor-
dination, and collective action problems within the functioning state.
It operates to allow those forced exchanges that enhance the welfare
of individuals who have been subject to the exchange, and to prohibit
the use of state power in ways that works to the net detriment of some
group of individuals. In the book, I also argue-and the point is a
difficult one-that the pro rata distribution of the surplus (i.e., the
outer ring) has beneficial effects in improving the chances that the
government only initiates the proper forced exchanges.4
Underlying the two pies metaphor is a consistent view of the way
in which collective behavior should be analyzed. Whether one deals
with the text itself, or with its functional justification, the two pies
image presupposes a strict form of reductionism, or methodological
individualism: any statement about groups of individuals-whether
in political blocs, racial or ethnic groups, informal associations, part-
nerships, or states-must be reduced to statements about the individ-
uals who compose them. The point is true whether one speaks about
the rights and duties of the entities involved, or about the gains and
losses that these groups or entities enjoy or suffer from various con-
figurations of rights and duties. To introduce groups or entities as
separate bearers of rights is to allow a wild card into the system,
which makes it impossible to exclude one set of results and to
embrace another: there is simply no common metric which allows
one to balance the interests of groups or entities against individuals. If
groups count separately from, or more than, their members, then in
the end, any outcome is permissible depending on the weights
3. See generally Epstein, Taxation in a Lockean World, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y - (1986).
4. See infra pp. 12-14.
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attached to various groups. Political power begins with "we the peo-
ple," and there are no aggregations of individuals who are entitled, so
to speak, to special treatment on the ground floor. "Representative
government begins with the premise that the state's rights against its
citizens are no greater than the sum of the rights of the individuals
whom it benefits in any given transaction. The state qua state has no
independent set of entitlements, any more than a corporation has
rights qua corporation against its shareholders" (p. 331).
Armed with that assumption my view of government becomes
this: all questions of conflict between the state and the individual
must be decomposed into a complex array of conflicts between vari-
ous individuals. We cannot simply look at the overall pie; we have to
examine it slice by slice. To understand what the state may do to one
individual necessarily requires that we understand what individuals
can do to another, alone and jointly. More concretely, to know what
it means for the state to take private property from one individual
entails that we know what it means for persons to take private prop-
erty from each other. To answer the great questions of public law
requires us to get in on the ground floor by understanding how indi-
viduals do interact with each other and how they should interact.
The question of political authority is therefore approached by an
accretion of the knowledge acquired in individual cases, applied to
collective situations.
III. FOUR QUESTIONS
This approach can then be carried over to the four questions that
are addressed in sequence in Takings. First, what does it mean to
take private property? The answer to this question presupposes that
we have a conception of how private property is acquired, and the
rights that it confers upon its owner. It also sets the stage for a con-
sideration of the relationship of taxation, regulation, and modification
of liability rules to the analysis of partial takings. With the scope of
takings thus defined, the second question concerns the scope of what
is generally termed the police power: When is that taking justified
without compensation? Where there is no police power justification
for an admitted taking, the inquiry shifts to the last two questions,
which have more in common than is generally supposed. Third, when
is that uncompensated taking for public use? If it is not for a public
use, then it cannot go forward without the consent of the parties from
whom the property is taken. Fourth, assuming that the taking may
go forward, when is there just compensation? The issue of "rent seek-
ing" behavior is closely related to both the public use and just com-
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OUTLINE OF TAKINGS
pensation questions. As the connection is sometimes misunderstood,
I discuss it briefly as well. Finally, as the issue of transfer payments
and welfare rights is highly controversial, I single it out for brief spe-
cial discussion.
A. What is a Taking of Private Property?
1. THE ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY
The question, "what is a taking of private property?" presup-
poses that we can have some intelligible account of how any private
property is acquired, for such is essential in defining the boundaries of
the inner pie of original entitlements. If there is no central state
already in place, the mode of acquisition will have to be, as the older
common lawyers had it, by "natural" acquisition. This observation
then leads to the basic common law proposition that "possession is
the root of title" (ch. 5). The system is not perfect, but it does have
enormous strengths. It assigns things uniquely to one person against
another. It places limitations upon how much one person can
acquire, because others will be able to demarcate land of their own
from which they can exclude him. It can be combined with imputa-
tion rules about the ownership of airspace and subsurface lands and
minerals, which reduces the amount of resources that have to be spent
in acquiring ownership, so that more can be released for developing
and protecting them: the ad coelum rule is the most durable example
of this economical rule of acquisition, because it makes the ownership
of other resources to follow ownership of the surface.
The first possession rule can of course lead to unfortunate results,
as with well documented instances of over-exploitation of the com-
mon pool, with questions of airplane overflight at high altitudes (chs.
14, 15), or with cases of private necessity. Yet here, because there are
substantial social gains that can derive from regulation, we have the
very kind of state involvement that passes muster on my view of the
just compensation and public use components of the takings clause. I
will not belabor the point here, but the conclusion that I reach is that
the common law tradition of natural acquisition does very well when
measured by the best utilitarian standards that we can devise. I note
that for all the "moral" criticism of the rule, no one has actually pro-
posed any alternative baseline-let alone one that would work as well
in presumptive fashion-even if we assumed that we could start with
the postulate that there was a well functioning state (through its
imperfect agents?) with complete power to assign property rights in
whatever shape it sees fit.
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2. THE SCOPE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
A related inquiry asks, "what is the scope of private property
once acquired?" Stated otherwise, what does anyone get in acquiring
ownership by taking first possession? My answer is the traditional
one, that is, one gets the full bundle of rights, both in the physical
domain (earth to sky) and all the standard incidents of ownership-
possession, use, and disposition. These are certainly the standard
incidents of property as generally recognized both in ordinary usage
and in legal analysis. They have the virtue of providing exclusive and
exhaustive domains of rights for all individuals, without the prior
intervention of the state. This definition affords a working basis for
the analysis of those polar cases where government action is focused
against a single person or small group of persons. It also explains why
challenges to government action for the taking of property have been
so ubiquitous over our constitutional history, whether under the tak-
ings clause, the due process clause, or the contract clause. As the
institution of private property is fundamental and all pervasive, it is
not surprising that lawyers look to takings arguments whenever there
is any readjustment of property rights.
3. LARGE NUMBERED TAKINGS
This conventional conception of property has strong implications
for all sorts of individual cases, but for these purposes it is critical to
note the tight, logical connection between taking private property and
general economic regulation, taxation, and modification of liability
rules, for it is at this juncture that the book is most controversial.
Here my argument assumes a formal aspect: partial takings are sub-
ject to the same basic rules and analysis as total takings, whether done
by private parties or by the state. Partial takings may be done by
metes and bounds, by time (take the life estate, leave the remainder)
or by incident: prevent alienation, but leave the right of use
untouched; allow use, but hamper the rights of alienation. All of these
activities are part of the same central phenomenon so much so that it
would be quite pointless to distinguish between the taking of the
whole, coupled with a return of the thing subject to some legal restric-
tion, and the simple taking of the part, leaving the residue, however
defined, behind. Only an unthinking formalist could insist upon any
rigid and principled line between total and partial takings, or try to
identify some configuration of sticks within the bundle that fall
within the core while others do not.
The next step in the argument asks: How many people can you
take from at one time? The answer is the range can be from one to
[Vol. 41:3
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everyone: it depends upon what the taker does. There is no necessary
limitation which says that theft must be done on a unique personal
basis. There can be, and sadly enough have been, systematic pro-
grams whereby large portions of the population have been stripped
not only of their property, but also of their lives. There is no magic
here. The greater the number of people whose lives and fortunes are
affected by the acts of their neighbors, the greater the presumptive
social concern. If A imposes a restrictive covenant that restricts his
neighbor, X, from building a house, and does so by personal fiat
backed by public force, there is a taking of private property. Why
then is it different if he does it with the aid of B, and manages to
impose a similar restriction upon Y as well? The number of takers
and the number of victims does not change the quality of the act: the
network of covenants still restricts use. It is a nice convention of lan-
guage, but one of no moral consequence, to call the single act by A
against X a taking, while we call the acts of A, B, and C, collectively,
against X, Y, and Z, collectively, zoning.
The same point can be made formally. Takings are a function of
two variables, the number of persons from whom something is taken,
n, and the fraction or percentage of what is taken from each person, p.
The analytical point is that T (np) remains a taking for all values of n
from one to infinity, and for all values of p between 0 and 1. The
effort to find a narrower definition of taking that excludes economic
regulation generally requires one to partition this interval in each of
its two dimensions. Thus, for example, there is a taking where the
number of persons is less than some arbitrary number k, greater than
0 and less than n, and a fraction of property, p, is greater than some
arbitrary fractionj, which is greater than 0 but less than 1. As n and
p are both continuous variables, any such division is completely artifi-
cial, no matter where the line is drawn.
The standard judicial and academic effort to get around the point
by talking about takings as applied to either isolated individuals or as
applied to substantial things hardly solves the problem. All it does is
place the putative dividing line closer to n equal to 1, and top equal to
1. Yet it gives no account of what the legal response should be to
cases where the number of persons affected is greater than k, and the
fraction suffered is less than p-the new class of nontaking takings.
And it does nothing to indicate what happens when the two variables
are allowed to move freely and independently of each other. Saying,
as Justice Holmes said in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon5 that we
cannot go "too far" with regulation before it becomes a taking, only
5. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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says that such a line might exist without saying where it goes, or why
it matters. The modem scholarship that seeks to make sense of tak-
ings law out of Justice Holmes's distinction is a doomed effort to build
a lofty edifice upon a broken structure.6 More bluntly, the line
between regulation and takings is not principled, but incoherent.
Nothing in the vast literature on the subject has rehabilitated the dis-
tinction that it now occupies in modem Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Why should we owe any intellectual allegiance to a doctrine so funda-
mentally misconceived?
The same analysis applies to other forms of social control, from
taxes to modifications of liability rules. Is there any one who seriously
argues today that these systems are not ways to effectuate wealth
transfers between interest groups and hence between individuals?
Why then the reluctance to apply the prohibition against uncompen-
sated takings to this entire class of social transfers? If A takes $10
from X, and B takes $10 from Y, and so on down the line, what differ-
ence does it make if we call it a set of takings, a special assessment, or
a tax? Again the distinction is deplored, but no categorical demarca-
tion between takings and taxes is offered. "All regulations, all taxes,
and all modifications of liability rules are takings of private property
prima facie compensable by the state" (p. 95).
This broad account of taking does not imply that the government
can do nothing. If every government action that deviates from com-
mon law rights is some kind of taking, then we would have a total
prohibition against the state even existing. Both as a textual and a
common sense matter the position seems absurd. The Constitution
grants affirmative powers to the federal government; it recognizes
many in the state. It would be odd to say that the eminent domain
clause was a total repeal of all jurisdictional grants of powers. The
Constitution is not a suicide pact, but an effort to find a limited gov-
emnment solution to the Hobbesian fear of unbridled self-interest, but
which does not fall prey to the structural weakness of pure representa-
tive democracy. It is hard to think that any constitution, including
our own, disables government from protecting individual rights at all.
But neither my interpretation of the eminent domain clause nor
my political system calls in any way for this extreme result. I have
6. I include here the standard works: B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1977), which I criticized in Epstein, The Next Generation of Legal
Scholarship? (Book Review), 30 STAN. L. REV. 635 (1978); Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1165 (1967), which I criticized in Takings (pp. 84-86, 116-21, 154-58, 197-99); Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); and Sax, Takings, Private Property and
Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971), both of which I discussed briefly in Takings (p. 197).
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never claimed that just because a taking exists, that cash compensa-
tion must necessarily follow (to be paid for, no less, by taxes that
could never be collected). There are still the other three stages in the
analysis that have to be undertaken. Some takings can be justified by
the police power; and for others implicit in-kind compensation (e.g.,
the benefit of regulation or taxes) may be provided to the persons
whose property is taken, whether in whole or in part, so that the con-
stitutional standard of just compensation is in fact met. With this in
mind, the extensive coverage of the eminent domain clause makes
good sense. It states that in a system of limited government the bur-
den of justification is always placed upon those who would take pri-
vate property, no matter what or how they would contrive to do it.
B. The Police Power
The police power is the first limitation upon the scope of the emi-
nent domain clause. To understand its proper scope, it is strictly nec-
essary to recall the methodological individualism on which the entire
analysis rests. Where all the members of the group have a justifica-
tion to restrict an individual's conduct then that group has a justifica-
tion as well. Thus there are occasions in which A may justify taking
B's property, as in disarming an attacker in self-defense. Similarly,
the police power applies when a large group of neighbors disarm a
thief in the neighborhood or limit pollution by an industrial plant.
Likewise, the state can use force to prevent or control the private use
of force and fraud. There is no magic transformation of what consti-
tutes a tort as we move from the individual to the collective case. So
too there is no magical expansion of the types of justifications that can
be offered at the group level. Building an ordinary home does not
become a nuisance against many neighbors when it is not a nuisance
against any of them individually. The invocation of the police power
to justify most varieties of modern zoning laws therefore fails because
the end of government action is impermissible.
Still there are ends which are legitimate by this account of the
police power: zoning, for example, can be a method to prevent pollu-
tion by certain types of firms. Nonetheless, even if the end is legiti-
mate, there cannot be carte blanche in the state with regard to the
choice of means (ch. 9), as it is all too easy to have an overbroad
technique which effectively is turned toward an impermissible end.
The zoning ordinance that masquerades as an antipollution device
could easily be an effort to prevent (legitimate) competitive injury.
The hard question is the selection of means to achieve this limited
class of permitted ends, which is no trivial matter when uncertainty is
1986]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
introduced: anticipated perils may or may not happen; injunctions
can be overbroad or underbroad. Yet here the proper solution is to
try to reduce the sum of errors of both over- and under-enforcement,
where each is weighted equally. The concept of the police power is
not an "open sesame" to public control based upon public will, even
though it often has been twisted to that end. And the police power is
surely not as expansive as the public use requirement, from which it is
almost never distinguished in the modern law.7
C. Public Use and Just Compensation
Answers to the third and fourth questions, regarding the scope of
public use and just compensation, take the analysis still further.
There are many cases in which the distinction between many person
partial takings and single person takings will make a difference, even
though both are covered by the eminent domain clause. In the case of
partial takings from many, there often are, but need not be, parallel
benefits to those from whom the taking has occurred. This situation
makes it more likely that no cash compensation.is needed to bring the
books into balance.
Take a simple example. Suppose there are two identical plots of
land worth $1000 each. The two plots have a common border. A
strip of land along that border--each plot contributing half the
strip--is taken to build a road which benefits both parties equally.
When finished, the retained land of each (coupled with access to the
highway) is now worth $1600. What is the point of cash compensa-
tion for the land taken, where collection and distribution of such com-
pensation only increases costs and reduces the total size of the
surplus, here, $600 for each? The benefit of use of the road is com-
pensation for the loss of the land. It is implicit in-kind compensation.
But should we be satisfied simply because the compensation test
is met? There is still some question about the proper distribution of
the $1200 surplus generated by the road construction. To see the
point, vary the original example and suppose instead that land of only
one of these persons is taken to construct the highway. Now a cash
transfer from the other is necessary to insure that he participates in
the social gain, for otherwise when the dust settles the total value to
one is, say, $1400 and the other $1800. Both are better off with the
7. For an example of the confusion, see Loretto v. TelePrompter, 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
The two issues cannot be resolved by the identical loose public interest standard, for the state
must pay for takings that meet the public use requirement, but not for those that fall within the
scope of the police power. See Epstein, Doctrine Not Deference: The Eminent Domain Clause,
1982 Sup. CT. REV. 351.
[Vol. 41:3
OUTLINE OF TAKINGS
road, but in different proportions, i.e., 2 to 1. The just compensation
requirement is clearly satisfied-both have increased net worth.
Nonetheless there is something uneasy about the situation. Ideally
one wants to have the same distribution of benefits whether all the
land is taken from one, half from each, or indeed, any other division.
To adopt a rule that makes no adjustments for the benefit of the
landowner, the greater fraction of whose land is taken, is not simply
to tolerate a particular distributional result. It will have negative allo-
cative effects as well. Without equalization of the gain ex post, each
landowner ex ante will seek to have the road located someplace off his
land to which he has complete access. Allowing strategic games of
this sort increases the possibility that the state may end up placing the
road in the wrong place, with the added disadvantage that real
resources will be dissipated in factional strife. This concern with the
division of the surplus from needed government action, and nothing
more complex, is what drives my analysis of both the just compensa-
tion requirement (the first $2000) and the public use requirement (the
$1200 in joint gains).
Clearly the examples here can be made more complex in any
number of ways. Valuation could be unclear; the number of parties
might increase; their positions might not be identical; the administra-
tive costs of making transfers is positive. In principle, therefore, the
right division of the surplus may come at too high a price. Nonethe-
less, the concern with the proper division of the surplus allows one to
give the sensible account to the public use requirement that much of
the traditional literature has ignored. The taking of land under the
Mill Act, or the creation of an easement by necessity, has always been
the source of doctrinal anxiety because the benefit seems to be private.
One could argue that some member of the public gets some marginal
benefit from the activity, but then there is the question why an ounce
of public concern justifies a pound of private taking. Yet in my view
the two situations are the same. The division of the surplus in the two
party situation simply replicates the division of the surplus in the case
of taking of property with just compensation for public use. Taking
into account both public and private gain the social surplus is divided
equally in both situations. The intuitive pull in favor of the Mill Act
is far stronger than the traditional legal arguments used to justify it.'
Here again the effort is not to endorse either zero or unlimited govern-
ment. It is not an effort to be liberal or conservative, but to identify
the size of an optimal government, constrained to behave in a respon-
sible fashion. To give the state the absolute power of parcelling out
8. See Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. - (1986).
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the surplus at will in the formation of collective goods introduces the
very bargaining problems that the eminent domain clause is designed
to avoid. This interpretation of the public use requirement differs
from the received wisdom of the subject, which treats public use as a
pointless appendage to the overall clause. But it is an account of pub-
lic use which integrates the language of the text into the structure of
the clause far better than any other.
All this is not to say that the implementation of the public use
and just compensation clause requirements are straightforward in all
cases. I think that I have given a clear account of what a taking is,
one which emphasized the loss of rights from the original common
law bundle. But there is no reason to expect that one can give the
same crystalline account (or as is sometimes said, "formally realiza-
ble" account) of when compensation has been provided. But why
should that be a surprise? In the ordinary case of the condemnation
of land for a highway, there is no doubt that the land has been taken,
yet there will often be disputes over its proper valuation. Should one
consider current use, or highest and best use? Should one take into
account the changes in value, positive or negative, of the land which
was retained? Should one weigh the implicit benefits and costs that
are conferred upon the landowner by virtue of the full condemnation?
No one says that we should abandon the just compensation problem
in its entirety because these questions of valuation raise hard matters
of principle as well as delicate questions of assessment.
The same is true with large numbered takings. In some cases it is
easy to figure out the cost of the statute or a regulation. It is neces-
sary simply to look at the changes in the value of the underlying
assets. The City of Berkeley9 imposes a rent control law; does anyone
think that the sharp reduction in prices in newly regulated rental
structures bears no relationship to the diminished flow of future
receipts and profits from the asset? Or that zoning does not work to
shift wealth as a consequence of the shift in entitlements? There are
even more ambitious forms of social control, such as comprehensive
wage and price controls, or collective bargaining, that cannot be
priced by seeing how the costs of regulation are incorporated into the
value of a particular asset, like land. But there are other ways to get
evidence on these points, and the book explains at length why the
common pool test, the disproportionate impact test, and the motive
test do give information (ch. 14). These tests will be far from perfect,
but what is the alternative? The right question is only this: Are these
tests better than simply saying that once we entertain the prospect of
9. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986).
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general social legislation, there are no restraints on legislative power?
Stated otherwise, do the tests succeed in sufficiently delineating what
they permit and prohibit to make it worthwhile to tolerate uncertain-
ties at the margin? I think they do.
It is worth speaking about these tests briefly. The relevance of
common pools is as follows. Where resources are subject to well-
defined property rights, voluntary transactions can move them to
higher valued uses. Yet once natural resources are placed in common
pools, there is a tendency for private parties to overconsume to the
detriment of overall welfare, as they get all of the gain from private
consumption and bear only a small fraction of the total loss to the
original stock. In principle, a set of voluntary agreements among all
users of the common pool could create gains in which all could share,
but the division of the proceeds creates a large stumbling block that
only rarely can be overcome. Absent the universal agreement, the
premature destruction of the pool continues. This unhappy outcome
is exemplified by the exhaustion of the fishery, where the common
resources cannot be conserved because the bargaining among fisher-
men tends to break down. Where resources are moved from common
pools into well-defined private ownership, therefore, the total social
yield is likely to be positive, so that there is enough for winners to
compensate losers, i.e., enough to insure that just compensation can
be provided all, be it in cash (e.g., for those who are denied total
access to fishing) or in kind (e.g., specified rights to fish in the con-
trolled regime).
The converse proposition is every bit as important. When
resources, which are subject to well-defined private rights, are placed
into common pools, then the presumption is that their value dimin-
ishes. There is no longer enough wealth for winners to compensate
losers, and hence no reason to believe that the necessary compensa-
tion has been provided, be it in cash or kind, as the just compensation
language requires. It is here that the taking must be struck down.
The zoning statute is the opposite of the fishery or the oil pooling
arrangement, precisely because it makes the decision whether or not
to build collective and uncertain, where once it was vested in private
individuals whose only constraints were the law of nuisance, which
itself worked off well-defined boundary conditions, chiefly, but not
exclusively, associated with physical invasion tests. The zoning stat-
utes typically create the very bargaining problems that the common
control over the fishery avoids. Collective bargaining agreements in
the labor context are another illustration of the same problem. Hold-
outs and bargaining games now predominate. In contrast, before the
1986]
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statute there were (relatively) competitive markets in employment,
where the wages were set without the risk of system-wide bargaining
breakdown.
The motive test is relevant for a different reason. Quite simply, if
one group announces that it wants to transfer wealth from a rival to
itself, why not believe it? Clearly this test will diminish in power if
any court should decide to attribute to interest groups the very conse-
quences that they desire. But today the test works to identify trans-
fers that are designed to take property without just compensation
precisely because there are no effective constitutional constraints
against this behavior, so that no one exercises caution in identifying
the redistribution that is sought. The political candor in our present
constitutionally unrestrained environment is quite revealing.
The disproportionate impact test works off the general theory of
incentives. If a person has the same stake as a potential winner that
he has as a potential loser, his private incentive is to maximize his net
winnings over his net losses. Where both gains and losses are pro
rata, then the only way the person will be able to achieve this situation
is to opt for that general rule which will maximize the welfare of the
whole, for then he will maximize his share as well. The theory of
disproportionate impact thus seeks to create incentive compatible
structures so that persons who work for their own private interest
advance the social interest as well. Many general statutes, e.g., the
statute of frauds and the statute of limitations, have this character,
and such is true with many of the general features of contract and tort
law, whether captured in the doctrine of consideration or proximate
cause. The variations in doctrine do not work to shift wealth across
classes because persons do not know whether they will in some future
concrete case be helped or hurt by the rule.
An analogy might help. A perfectly pro rata stock dividend of
common stock on common stock does nothing to shift wealth between
shareholders. More generally, a perfectly pro rata rule which changes
legal rights should also leave the relative wealth positions unchanged.
That rule should (unlike the stock dividend) have the capacity to
improve overall welfare as well. The advantage therefore of the dis-
proportionate impact test is that it allows a court to assess the com-
parative desirability of different social states even if it is quite
impossible to make any direct measurement of the gains or losses all
persons receive from some general enactment. The test itself receives
obedient lip service in the decided cases, 10 but by judges who, once
10. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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they have noted its intrinsic fairness, have been unable to articulate
the functional reasons for its importance.
In an ideal world one would hope that all three tests would point
in the same direction. The looseness in real cases is that they often
point in opposite directions. Such should hardly be surprising given
that the task at hand is valuation, which is always slippery and elu-
sive. (The standard tests of value, replacement cost less depreciation,
capitalization of earnings, and comparable values, also yield different
values in ordinary condemnation cases as well. But we still condemn
property.) Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to dwell too much on
the cases where the tests conflict. There are lots of clear cases in
which my tests all point in the same direction, which is why I take so
implacable a stand against most zoning, rent control, collective bar-
gaining, progressive taxation, and the like. There are also cases which
are clear the other way, as with oil and gas pooling, certain
antinuisance regulations, recordation statutes, and modifications of
general tort rules of broad application. The distinctions that are made
are worth drawing and they yield results that stand in sharp contrast
with modern law which pretends that virtually all general social regu-
lation is outside the eminent domain clause.
D. Rent Seeking
These three tests of just compensation (like the parallel public
use requirement) are also tied together by the general concern with
"rent seeking behavior."" In economic terms a rent is the difference
between the highest and the second best use to which any particular
property can be put. If the highest value is $100, and the second high-
est is $60, the owner of the resource will continue to deploy the thing
at its highest use so long as it is subject to a tax of less than $40-or
so it first appears. Within the political arena taxes and regulations of
all sorts have been proposed on the ground that the change in the
wealth will have no effect on the use of the resource, and by implica-
tion on overall levels of production. Nonetheless this optimistic sce-
nario works only if the taxes and regulations could be costlessly
generated outside of the political process. Once it is clear that these
taxes and regulations do not just simply appear, then it is no longer
possible to maintain the position that the legislated shift in wealth has
no effect upon production levels overall. The owner of the resource
will spend money to defeat or deflect the tax. Those who benefit from
it will spend resources in order to acquire the resource in question.
11. See generally (ch. 14); Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U.
CM. L. REV. 703 (1984).
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Both those expenditures are deadweight losses, so that the outcome of
the process is necessarily a negative sum game-regardless of who
wins the struggle. The point here is not only of concern for political
theory. It ties into the structure of the eminent domain clause as well.
If these regulations and taxes are takings, then to the extent they are
the outgrowth of rent seeking behavior, the very existence of a nega-
tive sum game, shows some persons have not been compensated with
in-kind government benefits for the loss of their property rights. The
program therefore must be struck down. Rent seeking behavior
dominates when legislation creates common pools, is motivated by the
desire to secure special gains, or creates disproportionate impacts.
E. Welfare Rights
One important implication of this general theory is that it pros-
cribes both as a matter of constitutional and political theory all
coerced transfer systems, including those designed to aid the poor and
the needy. Here of course the argument proceeds only as a matter of
first principle, as it seems clear that the heavy reliance interests upon
existing transfer systems makes it quite impossible to root them out as
a constitutional matter, or even to want to do so (pp. 324-29).
Nonetheless, questions of first principle are important if only for
the way in which they shape the general political debate over transfer
systems. And Takings is highly critical of these transfers. As a tex-
tual matter these transfer payments are raised from taxes, under cir-
cumstances where it is most unlikely that there is any equivalent
return benefit to the parties who are taxed. The argument therefore is
that these taxes are outside the power of the state to impose, except
insofar as is strictly necessary to forestall the use of private force or
political revolution.' 2 This conclusion surely runs against much of
our political tradition, and is I think the most controversial point in
the book, and more will be said about it in the general discussion that
follows. Nonetheless, from the vantage point of general political the-
ory, it is important to understand the functional justifications for this
straightforward doctrinal implication. Transfer payments between
rich and poor have the same negative welfare consequences that are
associated with other forms of transfers. They bring forward the
cycle of thrust and resistance that tends to reduce the overall level of
12. There is a question of whether the "state" here refers to federal or state government. I
did not attend sufficiently to the questions of incorporation in the book (p. 307 n.2). In fact,
there are good reasons, discussed at the Conference, for thinking there is a stronger case for
implementing transfer systems at the state level, owing to the exit rights available to the parties
taxed. Proceedings of the Conference on Takings of Property and the Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 49, 97 (1986).
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social welfare. Nor is it very clear that they do much to eliminate
poverty, because they reduce the incentive of all persons to produce.
The successful find that much of their gains are taxed away from
them, while the poor find that their energies are better devoted to the
acquisition of transfer payments than to the creation of real wealth.
There is of course far more to welfare and transfer payments
than this simple observation suggests. It seems quite clear, for exam-
ple, that to the extent that persons can make interpersonal compari-
sons of utility, they would assign a greater utility to a given sum of
money to a poor person than a rich one. This fact alone distinguishes
transfer payments from rich to poor from all other types of transfers.
It is also just that observation that accounts for the enormous amount
of charitable giving, much of it conducted through religious organiza-
tions. The argument against welfare rights therefore does not assume
that there is no case for charitable assistance. To the contrary, the
insistence of the imperfect social obligation of benevolence to those in
need is an effort to respond to that problem. The strength of a consti-
tutional prohibition against coerced transfers is that there is no reason
to believe that forced systems of wealth transfer will ever be an effec-
tive means to alleviate poverty within the social system at large, no
matter how noble the end. There are cases where a moral obligation
should not be transferred into a legal imperative.
IV. THE AGENDA
In closing I should note that Takings is an effort to find in a
single clause of the Constitution the distillation of a comprehensive
political theory. If the book is correct, then it is possible to find gui-
dance in a single provision to the fundamental problems of political
obligation. The same analysis that applies to the acquisition of origi-
nal property rights carries over to the largest questions of social
organization. It is clear that these are not modest claims, and clearer
still that these are highly controversial, as the transcript of the pro-
ceedings of the San Diego Conference, and the accompanying papers
so clearly reveal.
19861
